them --even if this illusion were subjectively indistinguishable from the real thing.
By the same token, we do want happiness. But we want happiness based on the actual facts rather than one based on false illusions. This is inconsistent with happiness theory in its usual subjectivist form. Of course, it is clearly in our interest to take this attitude. It is very dangerous to base one's life on false assumptions because this will lead to making important practical decisions on such assumptions.
Yet, perhaps the most important objection to happiness theory in its usual form is that it cannot admit the possibility of truly altruistic actions. It is committed to the view that whatever we do we always do it for the sake of our own happiness. Yet, this would mean that even our ostensibly altruistic actions meant to benefit other people were done by us primarily to promote our own happiness and our own interests rather than to promote these people's happiness and their interests --which would mean that they Tvere not truly altruistic actions. But this would be surely an absurd view.
For instance, when parents do various things for their children and perhaps even make great sacrifices for them, they presumably do this mainly for the sake of their children's happiness rather than for the sake of their own. They may feel happy to do these things for their children but their own happiness will be only a secondary consideration. Their primary aim will be to help their children rather than to derive some extra pleasure or some extra happiness from helping them.
Finally, happiness theory cannot explain why many people want not only a happv life but one with some worthwhile accomplishments.
By nature and by choice we are social creatures rather than solitary ones. Perhaps this is the deeper reason why we have genuine altruistic concern for other people; why we want to make worthwhile contributions to some objectives we share with many othrr people in intellectual, artistic, social and political life; and why our interests reach out tar beyond our own inner experiences and very much extend to states of affairs in the oursir e world. (As I have already suggested, to pay close attention to the outside world is also clearly in our self-interest.) 3. Autonomous desires.
Another way we can describe the basic difference between hedonistic theories l.ke happiness theory and nonhedonistic theories like preference theory is this. Some of cllr desires are no doubt based on hedonistic considerations: we may desire something beca~ise we expect to derive pleasure from it or because it would be painful for us to be deprix t : d of ir. Hedonistic theories claim that our desires are based on such hedoni:-ic considerations. In contrast, nonhedonistic theories maintain that we also have autonomols desires not based on such considerations.
I have already argued that our altruistic desires and our desire for a life with worthwhile accomplishments are such autonomous desires.
Moreover, it often happens that our pleasures are determined by our desires, rat:;er than the other way around as hedonistic theories would suggest. For instance, when ive are pleased with a victory of our favorite sports team, we do so because we had a xi,r desire for this team to win, rather than because this team's victory had an intrirsic pleasure-producing quality independent of our prior desire for their victory. Thus, our desire for them to win was an autonomous desire not based on independent hedonistic considerations.
Finally, let me adduce two examples, involving two of our basic instinctive drives, hunger and curiosity. No doubt, we sometimes eat because we expect that our eating will be a pleasant experience, or because we find our strong hunger unpleasant and want to get rid of it by consuming some food. But on other occasions we eat simply became we are hungry and have a natural desire to eat when we are hungry, even though our hunger is not really unpleasant, and even though we have given little thought to the pleasure tve may derive from eating.
Likewise, sometimes we try to find out some information because we think it will be pleasant to have it, or that it will be unpleasant not to satisfy our curiosity. But we may also try to obtain some information simply because we have a natural desire to satisfy our curiosity, regardless of the pleasure we may feel by doing so, and of the displeasure we may feel by not doing so.
Thus, contrary to hedonistic theories, we do have autonomous desires not based on hedonistic considerations.
4-Actual preferences and informed preferences.
In most branches of economics, a person's utility function is usually defined in terms of all his preferences (assuming that the latter satisfy the usual regularity axioms). But in welfare economics and in ethics we want to distinguish between those choices of a person that really express his true preferences and his true interests at a deeper level, from those choices of his that fail to do so because they are based on incorrect information or cn ignorance or neglect of some important information.
Accordingly, I shall distinguish between a person's actual preferences as indicated by his choice behavior and by his verbal statements, and his informed preferences, defined as the hypothetical preferences he would have had he all relevant information and had k.e made full use of this information.
It is convenient to extend the term informed preferences also to those actu.1 preferences of a given person that acrree with his hypothetical informed preferences as just defined, and to use the term mistaken preferences to describe those actual preferences f his that disagree with his informed preferences.
We can define a person's informed desires and his mistaken desires in a similar waj.. A person's informed preferences and desires are defined as what his preferences a n i desires would be like under some hypothetical conditions. This of course means that they are not directly observable empirical variables as his actual preferences and desires are b -t rather are theoretical constructs.
Suppose that Ron has a bad case of pneumo~la, for which A is the best medicaticn.
But he erroneously thinks that B is the best medication, even though the latter would :e quite ineffective against the type of pneumonia he has. As a result, in terms of his acn a1 preferences, he would prefer to be given B rather than A. Yet, under our definitions, 1,.
must say that, in terms of his informed preferences, he would prefer A over B, because t h s would be his preference if he knew the relevant medical facts.2
It seems to me that, at least in welfare economics and in ethics, a person's uti1:ry function should be defined in terms of his hypothetical informed preferences rather than in terms of his actual preferences because some of the latter may be badly mistaken (cf. , 1958, 1977a, and 1977b) . Some other authors have made basically similar proposals. In contrast to the actual-preference theory that most economists use in defining people's utility functions, I shall describe this approach as informed-preference the01-v.~ This approach enables us to define a person's utility function and his true interests in terms of his own preferences.4 Yet, it permits us to bypass his possibly mistaken actua! preferences which are contrary to his own interests, in favor of his own, more fundamental, informed preferences, which can be considered as his actual preferences as freed from the distorting effects of his factual errors.'
Marsanyi

Informed preferences about drug addiction
A good test case for our theory is that of drug addiction. A drug addict has strong reasons for trying to break his drug habit because he knows that it greatly reduces the control he has over his own life, and may sooner or later ruin his health, his ability to work, and his family life. Yet, he also has strong reasons for maintaining his drug habit because he may strongly enjoy his drug-induced euphoria, and because he knows that the withdrawal process would be very unpleasant for him.
The problem takes a special form in the case of terminally ill people suffering from a very painful disease (such as cancer), who may get addicted to some pain-killi~g drugs.
For them the case for giving up their pain-killing drugs will be much weaker and the case for their continued use will be much stronger than it would be for an ordinary drug addict. is what he sh0111d actually do. Yet, even after making this decision, he may find that, wher.
he feels a n urge to take his drug, he seldom has the will power to resist this urgtl (Following Aristotle, the philosophic literature does describe this problem as "weakn~ss ' the will.") Yet, at least if he seems to have a serious desire to break his drug habit ( z C
shown, e.g., by his willingness to seek medical help in this matter) then we must acce1 the fact, it seems to me, that this is his real preference. Moreover, on the assumption th;
he has decided to break his habit after careful consideration of the rel~vant facts, we mu:
also accept it as his informed preference.
Of course, we must arrive at the opposite conclusion if he decides that he will b:
better off by not breaking his drug habit --at least if he appears to have made his decisioafter careful consideration of the relevant facts.
Likewise, in the case of a patient addicted, or in the danger of getting addicted, t:
his pain lullers, we have to accept his own well-considered rational judgment about whzt policy would be in his best interest. Presumably, most patients will desire to continu~ using their pain killers. But as Griffin reports ( o p cit., p. 8), Freud refused any strong paiz killer during his last and very painful illness, saying, "I prefer to think in torment than nct to be able to think ~l e a r l y . "~ 6. Spurious preferences.
1 have suggested that our preferences qualify as informed preferences if they are 1)ased on careful consideration of the relevant facts. Yet, it seems to me that we have to add another, very natural, requirement: It is that they should be our genuine preferences rather than spurious ones.
Let me discuss only two classes of spurious preferences. One class consists of the 7. Satisfaction and informed satisfaction.
Apart from specific pleasant and unpleasant experiences, each person also has a general feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his life as a whole. (For our purpose: dissatisfaction can be treated as a rather low level of satisfaction.) It expresses the degref to which his subjective experiences and the objective conditions of his life, as they are no;! and as he expects them to be in the future, given his own likely behavior in varioc:
contingencies, satisfy his own actual preferences at present. Obviously, a person:
satisfaction level is an empirical variable, in principle accessible to introspection.
One possible approach to utility theory would be to identify a person's utility levr, rvith his satisfaction level. This approach might be described as a satisfaction theorv ( Iutility. As is easy to see, it would be exactly equivalent to what we have called the actua preference theow of utility because both theories would amount to identifying a person utility level with the degree to which his actual preferences are satisfied.
On the other hand, Brandt (1982, p. 181) has convincingly argued that happine~:~ theory is equivalent to (a particular version of) actual-preference theorv. This means tha-.
depending on the specific details of their interpretation, all three theories are equivaler or are nearly equivalent.
Yet, none of these theories is equivalent to our informed-preference theory. BL.
now I propose to show that a modified version of satisfaction theory, based on people:
informed preferences rather than on their actual preferences, equivalent to our theoq Accordingly, let m? define a person's informed-satisfaction level as the degree twhich his subjective experiences and the objective conditions of his life, as they are n o 1~ and as they can be reasonably expected to be at various future times, given his own like], behavior at various contingencies, satisfy his present informed preferences. To put t differently, a person's informed-satisfaction level is the satisfaction level he would experience if
(1) his actual preferences coincided with his informed preferences and if ( 2 ) he were well-informed about all relevant facts as they are at present and as f~e y can be reasonably expected to be at various future times.
Since a person's informed preferences are not empirically observable variables but rather are theoretical constructs, the same is true for the concept of informed-satisfaction k*. what he considers to be the most appropriate numerical probabilities to all of them. Thus, the notion of reasonable expectations about the future must be interpreted, it seems to me,
;IS a list of carefully selected likely alternative scenarios, together with carefully selected reasonable probabilities for them, both these scenarios and the probabilities assigned to :hem being selected in the light of the best information available to us.9
Another question is, How much weight will a person's informed preferences assign ro his pleasures and displeasures based on incorrect information? In my view, this must be decided by his own informed preferences. Presumably, they will assign less weinht to them than to his pleasures and displeasures based on correct information. But the mere fact that he will be mistaken about some important facts will have to be regarded a;
something undesirable (though it may become something desirable under some specijl conditions).
Apossible approach to utility theory would be to identify a person's utility level with his informed-satisfaction level. We may call it the informed-satisfaction theory of utilit,.
As is easy to verify, this approach is exactly equivalent to our informed-preference theo:?
of utility because both theories amount to defining a person's utility level as the degree -(I which his informed preferences are satisfied.
As we have seen, satisfaction theory and informed-satisfaction theory are equivalent to actual-preference theory and to informed-preference theory, respectively. But we C O gain something by restating these two preference theories as a satisfaction theory or as m informed-satisfaction theory. For when restated in this way, both preference theories w:l avoid the difficulties pointed out by Brandt (1979, pp. 247-253) , which are posed by the changeability of our desires and preferences over time. This is so because both satisfactic-1 theory and informed-satisfaction theory make use only of the relevant person's preseyt actual or informed preferences without making use of his past or future preferences in an jr way.'' Part 11. The nature of our preferences.
Our unreasoned preferences and the psvcholoRical learninn process
Some of our choices and preferences are based on more or less careful rational deliberation. These I shall call reasoned choices and preferences. Others are based on little or no deliberation. These I shall call unreasoned choices and preferences.
Psychologists tell us that our unreasoned choices and preferences are governed by our innate and acquired psychological drives." Our drives are acquired, extinguished, strengthened, and weakened by a largely unconscious learning process (conditioni~g process) based on the Law of Effect: When our behavior produces satisf3iny effects then our drive to act in this way in situations like this tends to groxv stronger; whereas if it produces frustrating effects then our drive to act in this way tends to grow weaker. In most cases, both of these tendencies are to our benefit because they make us repeat successful behavior and avoid unsuccessful behavior.
We also benefit (though are sometimes also misled) by our natural inclination rc follow other people's example and advice.
Even though this learning process does give us beneficial drives most of the time it may occasionally saddle us with drives of very questionable utility as a result of one particular aspect of this learning process, called stimulus aeneralization. The latter may make us largely reproduce our original response not only in very similar cases, but also in situations of a less similar type, or even in ones that merely remind us in some way of the original situation.
For example, we have good reasons to be grateful to a good teacher and to be resentful of a bad teacher. But it obviously makes no sense if we extend this positive or negative attitude to another person we meet many years later, simply because his physical appearance or his accent reminds us of our former teacher. Yet, owing to stimulus generalization, we may inadvertently do such things, perhaps never realizing how we have come to adopt such an unwarranted attitude toward this person.
Yet, even apart from unwarranted stimulus generalization, this learning process will seldom lead us to choices in agreement with what our informed preferences would require.
To be sure, it will make us repeat choices we have found satisfylng in the past. BuL typically these will be choices we have found satisfylng after a verv limited sampling of t'r-e available alternatives, and in ignorance of a good deal of other relevant information.
For instance, a habitual coffee drinker will rightly feel that he has good reasons -(I drink coffee every morning because he has found repeatedly, perhaps over many years, thlt coffee drinking is a satisfylng experience for him. But without comparing the taste :f coffee with that of many other possible morning drinks, and without informing himself about many other relevant facts (such as the costs, the availability, and the health effects of various drinks), he obviously cannot conclude that, in terms of his informed preferences, coffee would be in fact the best possible morning drink for him.
On the other hand, in many fields of human choice, including that of foods an3 drinks, it usually does not matter very much whether our actual choices are really the b e t possible choices we could make. Should our coffee drinker discover later that he really prefers the taste of another morning drink, it is unlikely that this discovery will significantly increase his utility level.
What is more, in fields where our actual choices usually make little real difference, we actually derive important benefits from the fact that our learning process tends to provide us with clear preferences, even if they may not be the theoretically optimal oncl;.
For example, by having definite food and drink preferences, we avoid spending a lot of time and effort in deciding what to eat and what to drink. Of course, when we have to make really important decisions then it will be worth our while to invest some time and effort. (Thus, people very fond of good food and of good drinks do find it worth their while to do a careful sampling of the alternatives and to obtain gastronomic information in other ways.)
To sum up, our unreasoned choices and preferences are governed by our drives, native and acquired, shaped by a largely unconscious learning process based on our personal experiences and on various social influences. By and large these work to our benefit but in general do not produce choices and preferences in full agreement with what our informed preferences would be.
9. Our reasoned preferences and the factual-assumptions model.
I now propose to consider the logical relationship between our reasoned preferences and the factual assumptions underlying them. When we form a reasoned preference between two possible outcomes A and B, we always do this on some factual assumption:; about the intrinsically desirable and the instrumentally desirable attributes that each of these two outcomes has. Our preference between A and B will be an informed preference only if these factual assumptions agree with the actual facts (as well as cover all important facts).
I call any attribute intrinsicallv desirable if it makes a n object possessing it into a potentially suitable end of our activities; and call an attribute instrumentally desirable if it makes an object possessing it into an effective means to achieve some of our possibls ends.
Sometimes our preference for some outcome A over another outcome B will be based on a combination of intrinsic and instrumental desirability considerations. FCI example, we may prefer to attend concert A rather than concert B both on the assumptiothat the former will have superior intrinsically desirable musical qualities also on thcl assumption that it will have greater instrumental value in enhancing our musical education and perhaps also in providing an opportunity to meet our friends.
Of course, we consider to be desirable atrributes and how desirable, i.e., b::
important, we consider any given attribute will depend on our own attitudes, presumab!!.
governed by our innate and acquired psychological drives, which also govern OLunreasoned preferences, as I arpwd in section 8. As a result, our attitudes are determined by our native temperament, by our personal life experiences, and by various socid influences.
On the other hand, the extent to which A and B actually possess any one of thesca attributes is a factua! clues&.
Yet, when we have answered all these desirability questions and all these factua! questions to our satisfaction, we still have to decide; all things considered, whether t:, prefer A over B, or B over A, or to be indifferent between the bvo. Typically this will t v 3 nontrivial decision because we shall have reasons to prefer A but shall also have reasor to prefer B, and our decision will depend on which set of reasons we find more importai.
in the light of all our desirability judgments and of all our fsctual assumptions.
Of course, in real life we do not form even our reasoned preferences by fu:l examination of relevant desirable attributes but rather restrict our attention to those attributes we consider particularly important.
I shall call this model the factual-assumptions model for reasoned preferences.
10. Comparisons with Hume's mode! of human motivarion.
Our model may be regarded as a modified version of the Humean model of h u m m motivation. Like the latter, it assumes that, intrinsically, our reason is an "inert" f a c u !~ fbr discovering facts and for inventing concepts to make tk,ese facts understandable to us.
Rut, unlike Hume, I assume that our "passions," i.e., our desires and preferences.
themselves crucially depend on the factual assumptions suggested by our reason. It is not :he "activist" nature of our reason itself that establishes this relationship between our reason on the one hand and our desires and preferences on the other hand but it is rather the dependence of the latter two on such factual assumptions.
Yet, when all factual assumptions are given, it is our psychological drives rather than our reason that determine the direction of our desires and preferences.
Moreover, whereas Hume wants to restrict our reason to suggesting means to our ends, themselves determined by our "passions," my model assumes that our reason not only suggests means to our ends, on the basis of the instrumentally desirable attributes of various alternatives, but also suggests &worth pursuing, on the basis of the intrinsicalh desirable attributes of these alternatives. l l . Ends and means.
Clearly, conceptually, our intrinsic values have lofical priority over our instruments.
values because it is our that determine the means we should use. But it is equall:.
ti-ue that the an we can actually attain depend on the means at our disposal. Thi;
explains the important empirical fact that our actual preference between two alternative; is often decided by instrumental and, in particular, by economic, considerarions.
For instance, even if we feel sure that concert A will greatIy surpass concert B in ir:
intrinsically desirable musical qualities, we may very well decide to attend concert 3 nevertheless, because the price of admission to concert A is more than we can afford, c ,-because getting to it ~vould take us too much time. Many idealistic social experiments and many noble personal projects have come to naught because they failed the satisfj tf-11 economic and the other instrumental requirements of viability.
Let me add that, from an empiricd point of view, the vely distinction between en~ls and means is much less clear-cut than it might seem to be in the abstract --mainly becau .E! we often develop intrinsic liking for some of our activities that originally had merely , i q instrumental value for us. I shall call this process transmutation (which was the term us 4
by medieval alchemists to describe the imaginary magical process supposedly converti-g "base metals" like iron into "noble metals" like gold).
For instance, aR engineering student may at first study mathematics mereiy as cn instrumentally useful skill in engineering computations but, as he gets better acquaintc d with mathematics, might develop a genuine intelleclual interest in it. This examr) e involves what may be called gnintended transmutation h e c a u s~ this engineering studt ~r presumably did not originally intend to develop such an intrinsic intellectual interest in mathematics.
Yet, there are also cases of intended transmutation. For esample, suppose a very lonely person without any friends wakes up to the fact that his life might be much richer and much more rewarding if he had a few intimate friends. Therefore, he makes an effort to acquire friends, and let me assume that he succeeds in doing so.
At first his attempt to make friends may be motivated purely by their instruments;
value in terms of his own self-interest. But he may realize that his own self-interest xvil:
be best served by his developing real friendships with his new friends, and by changing is original narrowly self-centered attitude to one of real appreciation of their positi1.e qualities and of their own friendly behavior toward him, and by developing a genuine concern for their well-being. Thus, he may make an intentional effort to convert his original pureiy instrumental attitude into one based on the intrinsic value of his new friends and of their friendship.
Such a transmutation of our purely instrumental activities into ones valued for their own sake can make our lives more meaningful and more satisfyrig. But it can also give some of our instrumental activities some semblance of great intrinsic value they do not really deserve. For instance, it may induce some people to make money making, status seeking, or keeping fit, into the central activities of their lives, pushmg aside other activities with much greater intrinsic value --contrary to their own informed preferences and to their own real interests at a deeper level.
12. Desires and preferences.
Our behLi\ior expresses both our desiresI2 and our preferences. Both of these play , :n important role in our motivation system. Of course, desire is a simpler and a more hnd,~mentrll notion than preference is. For a desire for A expresses a pro-attitude towarl or,e object, A. In contrast, a preference for A over B expresses a ranking of our pro--attitudes toward different objects A and B (or the fact that we do have a pro-attitudf toward A but have none toward B) and that we give our pro-attitude toward A hishe:
priority than we give to our pro-attitude toward B.
Yet, this very fact shows that our preferences provide information about our priorities --wbich our desires as such, as I shall argue, fail to provide.
We define our desires in terms of our preferences. Thus, the statement
"Jack desires A"
can be defined as being equivalent to the statement
"Jack prefers to have A rather than not to have A."
On the face of ir, we can also define our preferences in terms of our desires. Thus, we may try to define the statement
"Jack prefers A to B'' as being equivalent to the statement (4) "Jack's desire for A is stronger than his desire for B."
Yet, this approach will not yield a noncircular definition because a statement thai one of our desires is stronger than another is not an unambiguous statement. For instance, statement (4) has at least three different possible meanings:
It can mean that Jack's desire for A has a greater felt intensity than his desi-e for B has.
(b) Or, it can mean that if he had to make a choice then Jack lvould prefer th3t
his desire for A rather than his desire for B be satisfied.
(C) Finally, it can mean that his desire for A is more effective than his desire f x B is --in the sense that, when he has to choose, he will actually try to obtain A rather t h m B.
For instance, suppose that, after a good deal of soul searching, Jack, who is a hea7.3 smoker, decides that the pleasure he derives from smoking is not worth the risks it poses for his health in the long run, and that he should c y & smoking. Yet, even after this decision, when he feels the urge to light up, he is seldom able to resist this urge.
Clearly, Jack does have both a desire to g&t as shown by his decision to do so, and a desire to go on smoking as shown by his actual behavior. According to my story, kis second desire is more effective than his first because he actually persists in his smoking habit for the time being. Perhaps the felt intensitv of his second desire is likewise gresrlr than that of his first desire. Yet, he claims that he would very much prefer to quit smoking and let us assume he has shown that this is his genuine preference by seeking medical help for achieving this objective.
Let A denote givina UP s m o k k and B denote continued smoking. Then statement (4) will be true in sense (b) but will be false in senses (a) and (c). Now, taken in sense (b) it will be in fact equivalent to statement (3). Yet, the only way we can conclude t h~r statement (4) is true in sense (b) is by inferring this fact from statement (3) itself. T~L X , it would be circular reasoning to try to use statement (4) to infer the truth of statement
( 3 ) .
To put it differently, we cannot infer a person's preferences from his desires because the former provide information about his priorities, which his desires in themselves fail to do. (Of course, we could define a person's desires so that they would include full information about his priorities. But this would simply amount to incorporating his preferences into his desires and to obscuring the very useful distinction between the two for no good reason.)
On the other hand, as shown in most textbooks on economic theory, a person's utility function can always be defined in terms of his preferences (as long as the latter satisfy the usual regularity axioms). On the other hand, we cannot define it without knowing his preferences. For we cannot infer that he would derive more u t i l i~ from some situation A than from another situation B without knowing that he would prefer to be in situation A rather than in situation B.
Yet, we have just seen that we cannot infer a person's preferences from his desires as such. This of course means that his utility function cannot be defined in terms of his desires without knowing what his preferences are.
Apparently, this fact is often overlooked by a number of distinguished philosophers, who write as if it were possible to base utility theory on people's desires as such. This is indicated also by their description of various approaches to utility .theory as "desire theory," "desire account," "desire-fulfillment theory," etc., when "preference theory," "preference account," or "preference-satisfaction theory" would have been more appropriate descriptions (cf. Brandt, 1979; Griffin, 1986; Parfit, 1984, p. 494 ).
More generally, both in utility theory and in the theory of human motivation, ?kilosophers tend to concentrate much more on our desires than on our preferences whereas economists tend to do the opposite. Yet, both theories would benefit from a more balanced approach.
For, as I have already argued, a theory restricted to our desires cannot yield a v,-elldefined concept of utility at all. On the other hand, a theory restricted to our preferences is bound to overlook important empirical regularities concerning our desires if there are no similar regularities concerning our preferences.
In particular, it is bound to overlook the important empirical fact that human beings seem to have much the same basic desires --even though with considerable interpersonal variation in intensity --such as a desire for material comfort and for physical and economic security; for freedom to control their own lives; for having good health; for jobs suitable to their personal abilities and personal interests; for further developing their abilities; for deep personal relations in mutual love, in marriage and in true friendship; for having children and for being a good parent; for knowledge and for understanding the world and their own place in the world; for enjoyment of beauty in nature and in art; for ha~5r.g Yet, a distinguished philosopher, Tim Scanlon, has recently argued that all thcse approaches are unduly subjectivisiic, and that a person's well-being (he largely avoids the term "utility") is determined by the substantive ~o o d s available to him (Scanlon, 1989 (Scanlon, , ::7d 1991 . Moreover, he defines a "substantive good" as anything that makes people's lives a better. As examples for such substantive goods he refers to Parfit9s list of "good things" far human beings, which in section 1 2 I described as the objects of our basic desires.
Scanlon insists that, in ultimate analysis, what makes these things substantive g00 3s is the fact that human beings desire them. Rather, the converse is true: human bei~i js desire them because {hey understand that these things are for them.
I strongly disagree with this claim. In my own view, if I desire some object A then, in ultimate analysis, this cannot be explained solely by facts concerning A itself without invoking my own pro-attitude, or my own disposition to have such a pro-attitude, toward some of the facts concerning A.
I agree with Scanlon that --apart from our impulsive desires, which are governed '~y our inborn and acquired psychological drives rather than by any conscious rational criteria --our desire for any object A & in fact based on the assumption that it will be & for us to have A. But how do we know that it will be a good thing for us to have A? For instance, how do we know that it is a good thing for us to have friends? The obvious answer is, it seems to me, that we know it from our own experience, or know it from reports about other people's experiences that friends may help us to satisfy our psychological need for good fellowship and for emotional support as well as our desire for having fun and a good time. They also may give us practical help in various ways.
Moreover, they may enrich our lives by helping us to pursue some of our old interests and to acquire some worthwhile new interests. In short, they may help us to satisfy some of our important psychological needs, desires, preferences, and interests.
Scanlon objects to what he calls subjectivism in the theory of human values. As I 'jtated in section 2, I share his opposition to any subjectivist or "experientialist" theory of .~u m a n goals, i.e., to the view that the only goal of intrinsic value to human beings is their own happiness or, more generally, to have subiective experiences of certain kinds. As I argued in section 2, this view is refuted by our altruistic concern for other human beings.
and by our desire for worthwhile accomplishments of some objective importance. My o n r theory of utility is not an "experimentialist" theory. Rather, it is an informed-preference theory, interpreting a person's utility level as the degree to which his subjecti1.e experiences and his objective conditions satisfy his informed preferences, i.e., his preferences as freed from the distorting effects of factual errors.
On By the same token, intellectual activities in science, in history, and in philosophy a-e an important substantive good for many human beings. But it would not be that and would not have any intrinsic value for creatures devoid of any intellectual curiosity an1 disliking any disciplined intellectual effort --even if they did understand the instrument21 value of some intellectual work, such as that of scientific research when it yielljs economically valuable discoveries and inventions.
Even for human beings, the value of any particular friendship and of any particul3r intellectual activity will strongly depend on their own personal interests. Even th3 friendship of a very fine human being will be of little value to us if we have absolutely r,, common interests with him or her; and an opportunity to 11-ork on some scicntifi:, historical, and philosophical problems will have little attraction for us if tve have no real rrlterest in these problems. Scanlon (1989, pp. 11-12) admits that his theory does not exnlain what it is that rnakes all his "substantive goods" intrinsically valuable to human beings. But the reason is that --on the basis of some ill-defined anti-subiectivist ideology --he has arbitrarily excluded any explanation based on human desires and preferences. For in fact there is a rather obvious explanation: What makes all these things intrinsically valuable to us is the fact that they are the obiects of our basic desires, which we largely share tvith other h u m m beings, due to our common human nature and to our common b i o l o~c a l and psvcholoczicei needs.
--
Explanation and normative evaluation of human preferences.
In view of the fact that people's basic desires are remarkably similar, they can be largely explained in terms of our common human nature. In contrast, people's preferences show a good deal of individual variation, which can be explainpd m l y by i n d i v i d d differences in their infolmation and in their personal attitudes. Indeed, any variation in their informed preferences must be explained by differences in their personal attitude\ alone because, by definition, their informed preferences are the preferences they wou'd have if they had correct information about all the relevant facts, and correct informaticin about anything is of course the same for everyone. This means that differences in people's informed preferences must be due solely to differences in their innate psychological drives (which are probably rather small) and to differences in their personal life experiences ar d in the social influences they are exposed to (which might be sometimes quite large).
Apart from trying to understand a person's choices and preferences, we may also tr:~ to evaluate them in terms of some normative standards. I propose to argue that there a-(. only relevant normative standards we can use for this purpose. One is this persor.', own real interests as defined by his own informed preferences. The other is other peoplt'_s morally protected interests as defined by the norms of morality.13
To be sure, philosophers who oppose defining human values in terms of people', own actual and informed preferences may tly to use some normative standards independent of human attitudes, such as standards based on perfectionist or other similar criteria. Buy I shall try to show that such criteria would not yield viable normative standards.
For example, suppose that Peter is a gifted young man whose abilities would probably enable him either to become a good mathematician to become a goc::
historian. From a moral point of view, he is free to choose either profession. He c tempted to become a mathematician because he thinks that mathematical research woulgive him the best opportunity to make use of his outstanding abstract reason in^ abilit~:
But he is also tempted to become an historian because he is more attracted to a study c ' human behavior in past ages than to a study of abstract mathematical concepts.
Obviously he will have to ask himself such questions as, "Do I really have the ability to become a good mathematician or a good historian?" "What are the chances that m y present interest in either subject will persist over time?" "What are my chances of obtainin a good job in either field?"
Suppose that in the end he chooses a career in history. On what grounds could an outside observer say that Peter has made the w r o m choice? Presumably he has chosen history because he thinks that a career in it will give him a more satisfincl life, i.e., a life tetter satisfying his deepest preferences, than a career in mathematics would. Yet, some c~bservers may feel, and perhaps may rightly feel, that Peter has made the wrong choice,
i.e., a choice contrary to his own informed preferences, because he has misjudged his oxvn abilities, or has misjudged the likely persistence of his own interest in historical problems.
or has misjudged the chances of his obtaining a good job as an historian, or has misjudsed some other relevant facts.
Yet, it would be quite i-nappropriate for any observer to argue rh3t Peter has made :he wrong choice because mathematical work is intrinsic all^ more valuable than historical work is by some perfectionist or other similar criteria --even though Peter does not have the slightest desire to make his career choice depend on these criteria. Indeed, if Peter has no prior desire to foIlow these criteria in his choice behavior, it is hard to see how anybody could produce rational arguments to show that he nevertheless should have conformed tc these criteria.'"
To be sure, whereas people's actual preferences can be ascertained by obsening their choice behavior and by critically assessing their verbal statements, it is much hardsr to decide what their informed preferences are --because it would require us to infer wha. their preferences would be if they know some pieces of information they actuall;, do not know.
Yet, we can find out another person's informed preferences in hvo ways: by analyzing his own actual preferences, and by considering the preferences of othsknowledgeable people. For instance, suppose we know that, in terms of this person's uA?n actual preferences, alternative A has important advantages and no significant disadvantag-.~ as compared with another alternative B, yet this person is unaware of this fact. Then it will be a fairly safe bet that, if he did know the relevant facts then he would actually prei'2r
A to B. (Accordingly, we can usually safely assume that, if he had no obvious reasons -0 the contrary, any patient would prefer the most effective medication if he knew that it M as the most effective medication.)
Or, suppose that most knowledgeable people assign a high utility to some benefit A because they know from personal experience or from what they have learned about otter people's experiences that A tends to add a lot of extra satisfaction to one's life. Yet, a particular individual seems to have no interest at all in obtaining A. Then, it will be a reasonable assumption that if he were better informed then he would likewise assign a high utility to A, more or less within the same range as other people do --except if he hzs some special disability preventing him from taking full advantage of this benefit A. (F ;r example, some people may have special psychological difficulties in making friends and .l retaining them over any length of time. Others may be unable to enjoy some of the greatest works of world literature for lack of education, and so on.)
15. Interpersonal utilitv comparisons.
In earlier publications (Harsanyi, 1955 , 1977a (Chapter 4), 1992 , 1 have argued that we are often quite able and quite willing to make interpersonal comparisons of utilit]?
and that in any case we cannot reallv avoid making them if we want to make our moral ciecisions in a responsible manner. I have also suggested that making an interpersonal i:omparison between the utility levels of two individuals I and i amounts to asking the question of how much satisfacti~n'~ each of them derives from his own objective position, given his own preferences and, more generally, given his own personal attitudes.
Let A, and A, denote the objective positior~s if and i, respectively, and let P, and P, denote their personal attitudes. Let me call the pairs (4, P,) and (AJ, P,) the nvo individuals' extended alternatives. (They are "extended in the sense that they not only include their objective positions but also include their personal attitudes.) Thus, comparing 2s and j's utility levels really amounts to comparing the amounts of satisfaction they derive from their own extended alternatives.
In making such comparisons, in principle we could follow either of two alternative approaches. One is to take a third-person perspective and to try to infer the two individuals' satisfaction levels from the laws of human psvcholo,~. Yet, in actual fact, our understanding of these psychological laws is as yet very far from being sufficient for doing s0.l6
This is why I have suggested in earlier publications that we must use an alternative approach by taking a first-person perspective and by trying to achieve an empathetic understanding of what it may be like to be in either individual's objective position with the relevant individual's own personal attitudes. Moreover, in keeping with this first-person perspective, I have also suggested that each of us should ask himself whether we ourselves would prefer to be faced with the extended alternative (A,, P,) or with the extended alternative (A,, P,). I have argued that in deciding which way our own preference would go between these nuo extended alternatives, we should concentrate on these alternatives themselves, and should try to abstract from our own personal attitudes as much as we can.
Of course, I have realized that we can never get rid completely of our personal biases in making interpersonal comparisons of utility, but have been convinced that we c.m go a long way in doing so if we really try. The problem is similar to that faced by a liberal or a conservative historian with strong political views of his own who wants to discuss -l e events of past ages as objectively as he can. Perhaps he cannot completely free himsel:' of his own political prejudices but he can come reasonably close to this objective if he tries hard enough.
More specifically, in trying to understand another individual's personal attitudes 2nd
values, we can benefit, it seems to me, from Taylor's (1981) foreign values, retaining our own old values as much as we feel reasonable to do, perh<i?s with appropriate modifications, but being also willing to revise our own values in the 1i:;'nt of these foreign values whenever this seems to be the proper course to take. By follow -,g this approach, in the end we may achieve a broader point of view that does justice boch to our own values and to those of the foreign culture we are trying to understand. Suppose that Ron has access to both medications and, being unaware of the relevant medical facts, does choose B. ~bviousl~r, under our assumptions, by doing so he will act aqainst his tri~e interests and, in this sense, will make a mistake.
of course, by discussing the theoretical distinction between people's informed preferences and their actual preferences, we ha7:e not considered the practical --i.e., the moral and political -- practice neqative paternalism by refusing to help and to subsidize activities we consider to be against the agent's own interests. I am under no obligation to buy another drink for an alcoholic, even though I have no right to prevent him by force from drinking.
3.
In some earlier publications, I used the term "trce preferences" to describe what I now call "informed preferences," to indicate that these better express his true preferences than his actual preferences do. But now I am describing them as "inforned preferences" because they are actually defined as the preferences he would have if he were better informed about the actual facts.
(The adjective "informed" I have borrowed from Griffin (1986) , even though he speaks of "informed desires" rather than of lvinfor?,ed preferences. l ' )
.
In my own view, any acceptable definition of a person's utility function and of his true interests must be in terms of his own informed preferences rather than in terms of any other standard.
It certainly should not be in terms of our preferences and cur xralue judgments. In my own view, this is both a moral and an e~istemological requirement. It is a moral requirement because it trz~uld be a morally unacceptable imposition to ask another person, (grown-up and mentally competent, to conduct his own life in accordance with our preferences and our value judgments rather than his own. But more fundamentally, it is also an epistemoloqical requirement because we have no rational grounds for defining another person's real interests in terms of our preferences and g~n value judgments rather than his own --unless we have convincing 3rguments to show that the former are a superior standard for fiefining his real interests. Yet, it is hard to see how anybody zould produce such arguments. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what the logical structure of such arguments could possibly be. On the other hand, individual 6 himself will define his o:%m informed preferences in t e n s of his own best information about the relevant facts, i.e., in terms of the same information he will use in forming his own actual preferences. Therefore, his definiticn of his informed preferences will coincide with his actual preferences.
6 . Griffin, whose own views are quite close to what I am calling informed-preference theory, has nevertheless argued that t h~s theory would run into serious difficulties in some cases (Griffin, 1986, p. 11). But it seems to me that on closer inspection these difficulties entirely disappear.
He adduces the example of a person who right now has no likirq for caviar though he would have a strong liking for it once he had trained his own palate to savor its very special refined taste.
Griffin suggests that, in terms of his actual desires (or, as I would say, in terms of his actual preferences), this person has no lrking for caviar, yet that, in terms of his informed desires (his informed preferences), he would have a strong liking for it.
Now, according to informed-preference theory, this FersorAfs utilities must be defined in terms of his infor~ed preferences.
Y e t , when we do this then we obtain the conclusion that this person h.;11 derive a lot of utility from eating caviar. But this is inconsistent with the original story, according to which he will be quite unable to enjoy caviar before he has trained his palate in a suitable manner.
No doubt, this conclusion is inconsistent with the original story. Yet, the trouble does not lie in our theory but rather in the way Griffin proposed to define this person's informed preferences. His suggestion that, in terms of his infornee preferences, this person would have a strong liking for caviar needs an important qualification. The truth is that, in terms of his informed preferences, he will have a strong liking for eating caviar with a properly trained palate but will have no liking for eating it with an untrained palate.
Once we define this individual's informed preferences in this alternative way, our theory will yield exactly the right conclusion: It will tell us that the utility this individual will derive from eating caviar will crucially depend on whether he dces so with a properly trained palate or not, and it will depend on this precisely in the way described by the original story.
Thus, Griffin's interesting example poses no real difficu-ty for our theory. But it does show that our theory works only if cur definition of informed preferences is in terms of relevant information.
Brandt's (1979, tne more pointless it seems to be the greater the plausibility of the latter kind of explanation. Rawls's (1971, pp. 432-433) famocs example of a man spending all his time in counting the blades cf grass certainly comes under this heading. subjective probabilities for this purpose, rather than i f s or anybody else's subjective probabilities.
10. Parfit (1984 , p. 494), Griffin (1986 , pp. 16-17), and Scanlon (1989 suggest that the desires and preferences we us? in defining a person's utility level should be restricted to those for conditions significantly affecting his own life. Thus, desires and preferences for the well-being of members of his family and for that of his close friends should be included whereas desires and preferences concerning conditions in the distant future or conditions in remote parts of the universe should be excluded. Let me call the latter extraneous desires and preferences.
This is no doubt a sensible requirement. But I am not sure that it is actually needed as a special requirement. For a sensible person will presumably assign to his extraneous des~res and preferences (if he has any) very low priority anyhow so that they will have virtually no effect on his utility level. This will be the case even more if we define his utility level in terms of his informed desires and preferences.
On the other hand, even if we do not formally exclude extraneous desires and preferences form people's individual utility functions, we should certainly exclude them from our social utility function, together with all other external preferences (cf.
Harsanyi, 1986a, pp. 8-10) .
11. I shall describe only a highly simplified version of current psychological theories, omitting details not needed for my present purposes.
12. I am using the term desire in a technical sense, one covering all our pro-attitudes.
--
13. I am a supporter of rule utilitarian theory and would define the norms of morality in terms of the rule utilitarian moral ccde (see Harsanyi, 1977a (Chapter 4), 1985, 1986b, 1992) .
14. Another distinguished philosopher, Jim Griffin, whose vie;.:s are somewhat similar to Scanlon's, seems to think that the values we assign to various things should depend on their nonnatural qualities (Griffin, 1991, p. 63) . But he does not tell us how we can recognize these nonnatural qualities and how we know even that there are such things, and why we should be guided by them even if there were such things as nonnatural qualities.
l In this section, by "satisfactionrf I shall always mean "informed satisfaction" as deifned in section 7. But fcr cc~nvenience, I shall omit the adjective "informed."
16. Scanlon's theory of substantive goods does not help us in making interpersonal comparisons of utility (or of welfare) for the following reasons. Let Bi and Bj denote the assortments cf "substantive goods" available to the two individuals.
(i) Scanlon's theory does not tell us how to decide whether B, or B j is intrinsically "more valuablet1 (or whether the two are "equally v a l~a b l e~~) .
(ii)
By the same token, it does not tell us whether a rational individual will prefer, or should prefer, Bi or B j (or whether he will or should be indifferent between the two).
(iii) Even less does Scanlonls theory tell us what legitinate role if any a rational individual's own personal attitudes w i l l play, or should play, in deciding his preference between Bi and Bj.
